PL. ÚS 14/02 of 04 June 2003 “Standard and above-standard health care”

HEADNOTES

The contested provision clearly applies only to items mutually connected as part of payment-free health care, i.e., items which, under the heading of § 11 para. 1 let. d) fall under “health care without direct payment, if … they were provided within the scope and under the conditions provided by this Act.” The ban on accepting direct payment thus applies, above all, to the performance of payment-free health  care itself. This follows from the wording of the Act: “for this health care”; from the previous sentence it is undisputed that “this” care means “health care without direct payment,” and no other. The ban also applies to connection with the provision of this care, i.e. again payment-free care. However, the text of the Act also indicates that nothing prevents collecting direct payment from insured persons for health care provided beyond the framework of conditions for payment-free care. In the Constitutional Court’s opinion, the contested provision does not change the purpose and meaning of the Act, but only emphasizes protection of the sphere of payment-free health care from attempts to infringe on its integrity and narrow its scope. This interpretation is constitutional and quite proportionate to the meaning of the Act.